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Abstract. I study two privacy-preserving social network graphs to dis-
close the types of relationships of connecting edges and provide flexible
multigrained access control. To create such graphs, my schemes employ
the concept of secretaries and types of relationships. It is significantly
more efficient than those that using expensive cryptographic primitives. I
also show how these schemes can be used for multigrained access control
with various options. In addition, I describe how much these schemes are
resilient to infer the types of connecting edges.
1 Introduction
Motivated by the fact that social networks (e.g., MySpace, Facebook, LinkedIn,
Twitter and Buzz) have become extremely popular without being much con-
sidered its privacy issues. The main breaches of privacy in social networks are
related with the relationships between people as well as the profile information
of individuals. In recent years, retrieving sensitive information associated with
the data-analysis over social network graphs and its countermeasures have been
studied [14], [8], [6], [10], [3], [7], [11], [17], [16], [12], [5]. More seriously, one of
the serious misuses of social networks is related with crimes. In recent years,
teenage girls were kidnapped by men who met in the Facebook [2], [1].
In a network point of view, nodes can be either individuals or other social
entities, and edges can be relationships between such nodes. I can categorize
privacy breaches into four groups: 1) identity disclosure; 2) attribute disclosure;
3) link disclosure; and 4) content disclosure. The identity disclosure occurs when
the identity of an individual which corresponds to a node is revealed, and the
attribute disclosure happens when the attributes of an individual are revealed
more accurately than it would be possible before the data release. Attribute
disclosure is usually inferred by identity disclosure. The link disclosure occurs
when the sensitive relationship or communication between two individuals are
revealed while the content disclosure happens when the sensitive data associated
with each individual node is disclosed.
The best privacy-preserving system for social network over graphs should con-
sider all these problems. However, none of proposed systems could solve all these
issues in one shot since protecting against each privacy breach may require dif-
ferent techniques. Moreover, privacy-preserving system over the graphs and net-
works is very challenging in the following reasons. Designing graph-modification
algorithm to preserve privacy while providing the utility of the data is difficult
since the nodes and the edges in a graph are all correlated each other. Thus, even
single change of a node or an edge can affect the entire network. Furthermore,
quantifying the privacy is one of the biggest challenging research topics, and the
measurement for the privacy in a graph is much more challenging issue. A graph
itself includes rich information, but there is no standard method to quantify the
effect of the privacy gain or loss when a node or an edge is changed. Since two
nodes in a graph are indistinguishable with respect to some structural metrics, it
is difficult to decide privacy models for graphs and the measurements of privacy
breaches. As a result, it is hard to model the background knowledge and the
capability of attackers in this setting. Besides, it is also challenging to model the
behavior of participants involved in a social networks.
1.1 My Results
I am therefore interested in improving the privacy in social network and provid-
ing flexible multigrained access controls without using encryption or signature
(which, of course, can be added as an optional security and privacy enhance-
ment).
Therefore, my proposed scheme is considerably faster than those based on
traditional symmetric-key or public-key algorithms and can be applied to small
devices with low storage and computational resources (e.g., smart phones or
tablets).
In this report I describe two new approaches to improve the privacy for user’s
types of relationships and provide multigrained access control to social network
pages. After a preliminary setup that involves creating nodes of a graph, nodes a
user simply connect to nodes of other users. I analyze the privacy of my proposed
schemes, and show the probability of inference for a type of an edge.
2 Related Work
Liu et al. [10] surveyed the recent researches on privacy-preserving data analysis
over graphs and networks, and their work is a good starting point to do research
on this issue. They categorized privacy breaches in a social network into three
groups: 1) identity disclosure; 2) link disclosure; and 3) content disclosure. More
interesting thing in their work is that they also discussed the privacy issue oc-
curring in multi-party distributed computing. Backstrom et al. [3] defined two
types of attacks, active and passive attackers, in an anonymized social network,
and this model of attackers is widely adopted by other researchers.
2.1 Identity Disclosure
Since each individual is represented as a node in a graph, the identity of a node
is disclosed in the network. Thus a naive approach to hide the identity of a node
is to replace the identity with a fake name such as pseudo-random name, and
this technique is called (naive) anonymization.
Since Sweeney and Samarati [15] introduced the k-anonymity for data privacy
in tables, several variant methods such as l-diversity [13] and t-closeness [9] have
been proposed. However, I need to consider the structural information as well
as data in a graph model since the structure of a graph can be used to identify
a target node (e.g., using a degree of a node). As a consequence, k-anonymity
[15] and its variants [13], [9] are not appropriate for the preserving privacy in a
graph model.
Hay et al. [7] defined k-candidate anonymity model for social network such
that for every structure query over the graph, there exist at least k nodes that
match the query. They then suggested a graph perturbation through modifying
the graph by edge-deletions followed by edge-insertion. This approach could be
an attacker’s capability of re-identification of identities; however, it could not
support k-candidate anonymity.
Liu and Terzi [11] suggested k-degree anonymous graph to reduce the pos-
sibility of an attacker’s structural inference of a graph from the degree of each
node. A graph is k-degree anonymous graph, for every node there exists k − 1
number of other nodes with the same number of degrees. They argued that this
was efficient anonymizing graph technique; however, creating such graph requires
to probe all nodes and their edges respectively. Moreover, the position of created
nodes with same degrees should be considered.
Zou and Pei [17] described an algorithm for the subgraph created by the
immediate k neighbors of a node based on greedy heuristics. They defined k-
neighborhood anonymity of a graph. Given a graph G, for each node u, the
algorithm finds k − 1 neighbor nodes for u. For every pair of node (u, vi), i =
1, · · · , k − 1 and for each pair (u, vi), the algorithm modifies the neighborhood
subgraph of u and the neighborhood subgraph of vi to make them isomorphic to
each other. However, this algorithm is heuristic, moreover, expensive approach.
2.2 Link Disclosure
Zheleva and Getoor [16] addressed the problem of preserving privacy of sensi-
tive relationship in a social network. The authors introduced five different edge
anonymization algorithms by adopting different removing edges or clustering
edges between nodes under the very specific assumptions.
Liu et al. [12] considered edge weight in a graph and described two edge
weight perturbation algorithms for a different type of social network (e.g., trans-
action expenses could be the edge weight). They perturbed the edge weights
before they disclose them in the graph.
Interesting observation is that most related work have been done here with
respect to analysis of disclose relationships in a social network [14], [8], [6] instead
of suggesting new countermeasures. Narayana and Shmatikov [14] pointed out
that the anonymization of a graph was not sufficient for privacy in a social
network graph.
2.3 Using Cryptographic Techniques
Carminati et al. [4] described an access control model where authorized users
determined based on the relationships are only granted to access to another
user’s social network. They stored the encrypted relationship information with
relationship keys using public key cryptography.
Frikken and Srinivas [5] suggested a key management scheme in social net-
works without a trusted third party. With the derived keys, it protects user’s
content as well as enhances access control to a social network. A key for each
user is derived based on the proximity of relationship between users. Suppose
Alice, a friend of Bob, can access Bob’s social network with her friendship of
Bob’s key and Carol, a friend of friend of Bob, can access Bob’s social network
with her friend of friend of Bob’s key. Access can be controlled based on the
those relationship keys that have different access policy of Bob’s. This access
control is done asynchronously, which means it does not require multiple users
to be online simultaneously for the access control to allow access other users.
For the social network graph protection, they encrypts destination nodes as well
as edges in between. One drawback as the authors mentioned is that malicious
users could access to the content of other unauthorized users by publishing other
users’ keys.
3 Problem Statement and Goals
Once Alice builds relationships with other users, she has connections with oth-
ers. Connections between users in social networks can be represented as a graph
such that users can be represented as nodes and connections can be represented
as edges. These connections show that users have connected with other users, as-
suming as friends usually. In current social networks, there are two types of users
in terms of access grants: non-connected user (guest) and connected user(friend).
Guests only can see limited profile or web pages based on Alice’s privacy setting,
while all connected users as friends have same access level to Alice’s social web
page.
In practice, however, Alice can have many types of relationships with others.
As an example, Alice actually consider Bob as an acquaintance, Carol as a
competitor, and David as a business partner, Eve as an enemy, Flintz as a
friend, and George as a family member, yet she does not want to disclose how
she really thinks about others to keep good relationships without hurting other’s
feeling. Let us say this is social smiling. This is sophisticated and delicate issue
but critical information.
To achieve this goal, Alice hires secretaries and each secretary has two types
of tags: private and public name tags. The former is for Alice’s management
purpose, and the latter is for connection with other users. All secretaries of
Alice have same public tags (e.g., friend or poker face), but a private tag of each
secretary will be different based on an actual type of relationships, and only Alice
can see and tell the differences. When a connection established with another user,
Alice assigns which type of secretary will actually handle the connection with
the user. By doing this, Alice can keep good relationships with others in public
while she keeps her real thought in secret. In addition, Alice can grant a different
access grant to each connected user (e.g., by displaying different web pages based
on the types of relationships).
3.1 Adversary Model
I assume that an adversary can access any public information (a graph) and
has a polynomial-time bounded computational power. For threat models, I will
consider the two types of adversaries: seeker and attacker. A seeker is a person
who explores web pages in a social network site and collects (maybe sensitive)
user information with (or without) registering the social networks. This can be
done easily since a default privacy setting in many cases allows everyone to read
a user’s profile (e.g., Facebook).
On the other hand, an attacker collects sensitive user information more ag-
gressively and maliciously. I consider two types of attackers on a social network
[3]: active and passive attackers. An active attacker creates many new connec-
tions with users (targets) on purpose and then tries to find some useful informa-
tion with or without colluding with other active attackers. However, a passive
attacker does not have to create many new connections and just uses his already
existing connections. He colludes with other passive attackers, exchanges some
information learned from the existing connections, and then tries to infer some
sensitive information of target users.
In practice, this will be useful to infer some small-scale sensitive information
while the active attacker scenario might be appropriate to obtain useful infor-
mation for a larger number of targeted users. Hence, for now I will more focus on
the passive attacker for analyzing privacy in my scheme since passive attacker
scenario is more realistic in a sense that any malicious one can achieve his small
goal without spending a large amount time and efforts.
4 Proposed Scheme
4.1 Overview of Approach
Suppose Alice considers Bob as an acquaintance, and Bob considers Alice as
a competitor while they disclose their actual thoughts each other. First, when
Alice and Bob register in a service provider (e.g., Facebook), their secretaries are
also created respectively. Alice generates n number of secretaries (s1a, s
2
a, · · · , s
n
a).
And each secretary is in charge of different types of relationships such as friend,
enemy, acquaintance, and etc. For example, sa1 handles friends, s
2
a handles en-
emies, s3a handles acquaintances, s
4
a handles friends, s
5
a handles acquaintances,
· · · , sna handles friends. Bob also createsm number of secretaries (s
1
b , s
2
b , · · · , s
m
b ).
s1b handles enemies, s
2
b handles friends, s
3
b handles acquaintances, s
4
b handles ac-
quaintances, s5b handles friends, s
6
b handles competitors, · · · , s
m
b handles com-
petitors. Note that all users’ initial number of secretaries could be either same
or different, and I set them differently, and thus n 6= m, and each secretary can
handle multiple connections with other user’s secretaries.
Second, since Alice considers Bob as an acquaintance, and Bob considers
Alice as a competitor, a connection between s3a (or s
5
a) and s
6
b (or s
m
b ) will be
established. Thus the connections will be represented as (Alice)−s3a−s
m
b −(Bob),
denoted as {s3a(acquaintance
1
a), s
m
b (competitor
2
b)} and so on. The actual public
connected edge is s3a−s
m
b representing a friend. Then Alice and Bob disclose this
relationship graph to the public domain. We can represent these relationships
as a graph.
4.2 Naive Graph Creation
In this section, I will describe how a secretary-based privacy-preserving graph
with multi-grained access control can be achieved. Suppose a threshold value is
thu, and the number of types of relationships is τu for a node u.
– Setup Phase:
When a node u is created1, n number of secretary nodes (snodes) siu where
i = 1 · · ·nu, and τu ≤ n ≤ thu are created. For each type of relationship,
ru(t), 1 · · ·nu/τu snodes are assigned, and thus a snode s
i
u is responsible for
a ru(t) type of relationship, denoted as s
i
u{ru(t)}.
– Connection Phase:
Suppose a node u wants to have a type ru(t) relationship with a node v,
and the node v agrees with the connection to the node u by choosing a type
rv(t
′) relationship. Then a snode siu{ru(t)} will be connected as an edge with
si
′
v {rv(t
′)} of a node v, denoted as [siu{ru(t)}, s
i′
v {rv(t
′)}]. Note that u does
not know which type of relationship v will choose and vice versa.
Notice that for each u the number of secretaries can be different, and it has a
different type of relationship such as friend, enemy, acquaintance, and etc.
4.3 Advanced Graph Creation
In the setup phase of the previous naive graph creation, when a node u is cre-
ated, it simply assigns nu/τu number of snodes to each type of relationship.
But this does not desirably reflect our real lives. Suppose Alice has five types
of relationships: friend, acquaintance, family, business, enemy. Some types of
relationships might need more number of secretaries than others (e.g., in most
cases, the number of friends are much larger than that of enemies). Thus Alice
wants to assign more number of secretaries for friend and acquaintance than the
remaining types of relationships. Moreover, assigning many secretaries to one
particular type is not desirable to preserve privacy since an adversary can infer
that it could be friend or acquaintance when he sees connecting many edges to
1 You can consider the creation of a node u as the registration of your email/password
in the Facebook.
one particular node. Therefore, uniformly distribution of edges to each secretary
will be more appropriate approach so as not to disclose types of relationship.
To achieve this requirement, let a node u has j numbers of t type of relation-
ship, and one of which has different k(j) number secretary nodes, denoted as
ru(t
j
k(j)). As an example, Alice has four friend relationships, three acquaintance
relationships, one family relationship, two business relationships, and one enemy
relationship. Then she assigns 20 secretaries for the first friend relationship, and
10 secretaries for the second friend relationship, and 30 secretaries for the third
and fourth friend relationship respectively and assigns 25 secretaries for enemy
relationship and so on. Note that for each node, a threshold value for the total
number of snodes, and the number of types of relationship could also be different
since each node requires different levels of privacies.
I will use the following notations in this section.
– siu: A node u’s i
th secretary node
– ru(t
j
k(j)): A node u has j numbers of t type of relationship, and one of which
has different number k(j) secretary nodes. For example, suppose ru(t
j
k(j)) has
two friend relationship, friend1 and friend2, and friend1 has 5 secretary
nodes and friend2 has 7 secretary nodes. Then this is denoted as ru(friend
1
5)
and ru(friend
2
7). I will just denote it as ru(t
j
k) for convenience.
– siu{ru(t
j
k)}: A secretary node s
i
u is assigned to a relationship ru(t
j
k)
Then the advanced graph will be created as follows.
– Setup Phase:
A snode siu is assigned to a relationship ru(t
j
k), denoted as s
i
u{ru(t
j
k)} shown
in the notation.
– Connection Phase:
Suppose a node u wants to have a type t relationship r(t) with a node v,
and a node v wants to have a type t′ relationship r(t′) with a node u. Then
a snode siu{r(t
j
k)} of the node u will be connected with s
i′
v {r(t
′j′
k′ )} of the
node v, denoted as [siu{r(t
j
k)}, s
i′
v {r(t
′j′
k′ )}].
4.4 Comments and Notes
I describe some comments and notes in this section.
– The more active user you are, the more secretaries you can hire and more
types of relationships you can create by employing the concept of incentive
as necessary. The definition of an active user could be dependent on a policy
of each social network site. For example, an active user could be defined
by contributions to a service provider (e.g., Facebook) such as the number
of logins, the time to use, the number of people involved in a user’s social
network, the number of posting advertisements or the number of clicking
advertisements. Or this can be done, if a user is willing to pay additional
cost, then a service provider can provide more flexible and enhanced privacy
as described above.
– A user can distinguish his types of relationships of connecting edges with
private tags, while the connecting edges disclose any information regarding
types of relationships with one public tag of secretaries. The private tags
of secretary nodes (snodes) are secret information to the public. Thus an
adversary does not know whether an edge represents acquaintance or enemy
or something else.
– Each user can modify the types relationship of secretaries by swapping its
role for other secretaries’ role, and adding or deleting secretaries can be done
easily since this can be done by a user’s management of its directories or lists.
4.5 Multigrained Access Control based on the Relationship
Due to the fact that each user can manage his secretaries by creating them and
respectively assigning, deassigning and reassigning their roles with private tags,
each user can easily define the private access level to each type of relationships.
Alice’s example in the previous sections, she can assign a different access grant
to each group of people connecting to a particular type of relationships. For a
group of people who belong to her family, she allows them to see her personal
pictures, write some comments, and read her travel schedules. For the people
in the business group, she can let them read, write, download and post some
professional articles, and she can just display a bogus web page to a group of
people in the enemy group. On the other hand, she can temporarily give an access
to a simplified profile page without critical personal information such as address
or phone number to a new member (e.g., a friend of friends of friends), then
after she has some trust to a new member, she can gradually give a higher grant
to those members. Notice that Alice also can define more sophisticated access
controls by dividing a type of relationships into sub-types of a relationship (e.g.,
friendship, for example, can be sub-divided into friend, close friend and best
friend).
Another interesting possible scenario is as follows. Alice has relationships
with Bob and Carol, but she does not want them to know each other for some
reason through her social network, maybe because Bob and Carol are good
business partners of Alice, but Alice does not lose a new business opportunity
by letting them know each other and creating a new business without Alice.
Or Alice does not want to share valuable business opportunity between Bob
and Carol. Currently, however, in social network sites (e.g., Facebook), as long
as Bob and Carol have relationships with Alice, they can see each other in the
friends’ list of Alice, and then they can also create a new relationship each other.
Our scheme can easily prevent such possibility by putting Bob and Carol in
different types of relationships. Although Bob and Carol are in a same type of
relationships (e.g., friend), Alice can assign them to different friend groups, say
friend1 and friend2, and then can permit different grants to two friend groups
so that they cannot see each other via Alice’s social network web page. She
has another alternative to achieve the same goal by putting them in different
sub-type of a relationship, say friend and best friends. As I explained in this
section, my new scheme supports flexible multilevel and multi-grained access
control without much difficulties.
5 Analysis of Privacy
The scheme in this report provides privacy by employing the concept of secre-
taries, which hide the actual types relationship of a user from the public domain,
yet allow a user to manage them efficiently and easily inside. The more evenly
the secretaries jobs distributed and bigger number of types of relationships, the
more privacy the user can preserve with a denser and more evenly woven veil.
At the same time, however, secretaries are overheads in the view of management
of a social network. This overhead of managing secretaries for a user will be
increased, but this is not significant and thus could be ignored. However, the
overhead for an entire social network cannot be ignored. Suppose each user gen-
erates n secretaries and k types of relationships, and n/k secretaries are assigned
to each type of relationship, and each user has c number social connections on
average with other users. Let the total number of users in a social network be
m. Then nm number of secretaries will be created in the entire social network.
As I mentioned, evenly distributed jobs to secretaries imply better privacy
since denser connections to a few particular secretaries give a hint for a type of
relationship to an adversary. On the other hand, jobless secretaries result in an
unnecessary redundancy. To prevent this situation, in the naive graph creation
scheme, each secretary is necessary to be in charge of ck/n(= p) connections
on average. Now I will consider the privacy level of a user for the naive graph
creation scheme. Given the number of secretary, n, the probability of guessing
the number of type of relationships k is 1/n since 1 ≤ k ≤ n. Given the number
of types of relationship, the probability of guessing a secretary’s job is 1/k. Thus
given a secretary node, the probability of guessing a type of relationships is
1/(kn) For the advanced graph creation scheme, let l be the number of same
type relationship, and let each type of relationships has the same number of l for
the convenience of mathematical computation. In the example of the notations
in section 4.3, there are two friend relationships, friend1 and friend2, and thus
l is 2 in this case. We can consider kl as an the number of types of relationships,
denoted as k′ = kl. Then given a secretary node, the probability of guessing a
type of relationships is 1/(kln)
Based on this analysis, the level of privacy is more affected by the number
of types of relationships rather than the number of secretaries. Thus a user’s
real thought is veiled by the increased number of types of relationships with an
optimized number of secretaries such that k ≤ n. Given k types of relationships,
Alice can enhance her privacy level by increasing the number of same type re-
lationship, l, and creating the sub-types of each relationship, resulting in the
number of lists or directories of which Alice has to manage while minimizing the
burden of an entire social network.
6 Future Work and Conclusion
I have described two schemes - naive graph creation and advanced graph cre-
ation - to improve the privacy of social network and provide multilevel and
multigrained access control by adopting the concept of secretaries. The over-
head of adding and managing secretaries for each user might be ignored, how-
ever, the overhead for an entire social network needs to be minimized. Both
schemes provide privacy for types of connecting relationships with low storage
and computational power for a small device. I also analyzed an optimized total
number of secretaries in an entire social network.
In terms of further exploration of the vulnerability of privacy to the ac-
tive attack, one possible direction for future work would be to use inexpensive
cryptographic primitives (e.g., hash function or symmetric key cryptography).
In addition, other directions for future research could exploit different privacy
measurements for my schemes.
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